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THE EFFECT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST ON
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND TO
BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY*
OSCAR S. SMTH**
In March, 1948, President Truman for the first time invoked the
emergency procedures of Title II of the Labor Management Relations
Act.' The occasion for this action was a threatened strike of 17 Amer-
ican Federation of Labor unions at one of the atomic energy plants
in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. A Board of Inquiry, under the Chairmanship
of John Lord O'Brien, was appointed to investigate and report the
facts in the controversy.
In its report this Board found six issues of prime importance in dis-
pute. The first of these six prime issues had to do with a union demand
for a contractual restriction on its freedom to strike at times of wage
reopening or contract renegotiation. In respect to this prime issue, the
Board of Inquiry reported:
"Assurance of Continuity in Operations. The Union desires a
continuing contract, leaving open the question of arbitration, or
specifically providing for arbitration of unsettled issues. The
position of the Union may best be presented by direct quotations
from the statement of its representative before this Board-
'recognizing our grave responsibility to the people and to the
Government of this country, and our equity in this plant, we
wrote in our contract a clause called "continuity of operation"
which would not permit the Union under any circumstances to
have a strike, a slow down, a stoppage of work, or a sympathy
strike of any nature whatsoever. . . .' The Union proposed its
own clause because we do have a decided responsibility to this
entire nation in being in this plant.
"The Company proposes that a stated time limit be placed on the
negotiation of wage rates, that there be no arbitration of wage
disputes, and that the agreement of the Union not to strike shall
not apply after the expiration of the stated period."
On the face of it, this presented a rather out-of-the-ordinary situation.
Seventeen unions were threatening a strike to obtain certain conces-
sions. One of these concessions was a contract provision which would
* This paper was read at the Round Table on Labor Law at the meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, in Cincinnati, Ohio, on December 28, 1948.
** Director of Labor Relations, United States Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D. C.
'61 STAT. 152-156, June 23, 1947, 29 U. S. C. A. §§171-182.
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foreclose the right to strike for the future. The counter proposal of
the private employer, which these unions were unwilling to accept, was
patterned after the contract reopening provisions that appear in many
labor contracts in other industries, a provision that fixed a reasonable
period of notice and negotiations with freedom on the part of both
union and employer to utilize economic measures at the end of this
period. A study of this dispute cannot be expected to provide final
answers to the many questions relating to the effect of the public in-
terest on the right to strike and to bargain collectively. It will, how-
ever, reveal the extent of responsiveness of the particular union leaders
to this impact and of its effect on the bargaining relationship in this
specific instance. Consideration can then be given to whether this
situation is typical of other activities and whether a like effect is prob-
able elsewhere. The underlying facts were these:
During the first years of development and operation at Oak Ridge,
all forms of union recognition were barred by the War Department,
with the concurrence of principal leaders of organized labor. Such
action was deemed necessary in part because of restrictions placed on
meetings and hearings in the interest of secrecy of information. In
part, however, the action was motivated by a belief that this policy
would best assure against work stoppages which might be disastrous
to both the secrecy and the progress of the wartime atomic energy
development.
In 1946, after NLRB elections, unions were recognized in two plants.
One of these, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the plant involved
in the 1948 dispute, was at that time operated by the Monsanto Chem-
ical Company. Monsanto and AFL negotiated a labor contract. This
contract was without time limitation and barred stoppages, even of a
momentary nature. Provision was made for an annual reopening of
the contract upon notice by either party. However, it was agreed that
"all provisions of the agreement shall remain in full force and effect
until a settlement is reached on the proposed changes and said changes
are made part of this agreement."
When the Atomic Energy Commission took over the responsibility
for the Atomic Energy Program from the War Department, it requested
an Advisory Committee of three well-known experts in the labor relations
field to review this contract and appraise its adequacy. This Committee
reported: ". . . Taken literally, the Monsanto contract cannot run out;
the no-strike clauses and all other provisions remain effective till some-
thing is put in their place by mutual agreement .... On its face, there-
fore, the Monsanto agreement appears to afford complete protection
against strikes over contract terms, insofar as such protection can be
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
afforded by contract. But the Monsanto agreement is subject to two
weaknesses: (1) As a matter of law, a contract cannot be made to run
on indefinitely; either side may terminate it after a 'reasonable time,'
the test of reasonableness being up to the courts; (2) if the company
should hold out inflexibly against any contract changes, a very disturbed
labor relations situation might develop ... "
In early 1948, the Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Corporation suc-
ceeded Monsanto as operator of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
That company undertook to negotiate an agreement with AFL covering
the future operation of the plant. In essence, AFL asked for a continuance
of the terms of its Monsanto contract plus certain wage increases. Car-
bide asked for a contract with provisions, including a contract reopening
clause that was generally similar to the clauses in other labor contracts
covering its many private plants. These plants in general embraced
various activities in the chemical industry, as distinguished from atomic
energy. The deadlock in negotiations resulted as reported by the O'Brien
Board of Inquiry. At the end of the injunction period provided in
Title II of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Board of Inquiry
reported that the dispute was still unresolved.
In the meantime the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic En-
ergy in a report to the Congress advised: "The Committee is unanimous
in its conviction that the national security demands uninterrupted opera-
tion of the critical facilities of the Atomic Energy Commission." The
International Presidents of the AFL unions involved met with the
Chairman and other representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission.
The effect of a work stoppage at the plant was discussed as was the
action that the government would be required to take in the event of a
stoppage.
An election on the employer's last offer was held by the National
Labor Relations Board and the employees voted 771 to 26 to reject the
offer. The strike deadline arrived and the employer unilaterally installed
the conditions proposed in the rejected last offer. Negotiations continued
with the aid of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, how-
ever, and no strike occurred. A settlement was finally reached but only
after strong expression to the employees by top AFL leaders of their
conviction that the strike was not appropriate for use under the circum-
stances. The final settlement included substantial wage increases but
also involved less favorable provisions as to certain employment condi-
tions than previously existed. Throughout the dispute it was abundantly
clear that top AFL leaders were sensitive to the impact of the public in-
terest. When the injunction was discharged, sober judgment made it
[Vol. 27
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clear that because of this public interest a strike was not appropriate
and no strike occurred.
Our national labor policy is premised on the theory that in the face
of organization of employers in the corporate or other forms of owner-
ship association an inequality of bargaining power results unless gov-
ernment assures that workers possess full freedom of association and
actual liberty of contract including the right to select their own repre-
sentatives and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. Such an
inequality of bargaining power has been found to lead to strikes or other
forms of industrial unrest with a resulting burden on the flow of com-
merce and to aggravate recurrent business depressions. This premise
has withstood the test of experience over many years and is given
specific recognition in the statements of policy in both the National
Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act.
In a study of the Oak Ridge dispute, the question arises, whether
an inequality of bargaining power, itself conducive to strife, was created
in this situation where the strike was not appropriate as an effective
bargaining aid, and where no adequate substitute for this adjunct of
bargaining had been provided. The freedom of employees to engage
in concerted activities for mutual aid was clearly impaired. The public
interest'must also have had an impact on the employer. However, any
affirmative economic action to force a settlement would have had to be
initiated by the union. If a strike had occurred, the stoppage of work
would have been a' result of union action and the public would have
reacted accordingly. Both the Executive and Legislative branches of
the government, through their responsible officials, had made it clear
that a stoppage could not be permitted and that the facilities of govern-
ment would be utilized to maintain continuous operations in the face of
any walkout of employees. Action by government to carry out this
necessary intention would have had direct consequences in relation to
the employees and their union far beyond any relating to the employer.
It follows that the impact of the public interest in the situation at Oak
Ridge impaired the bargaining power of the union with a resulting un-
balance between the respective freedoms of action of the disputants.
Stated in another way, the responsiveness of the unions to the public
interest so limited their freedom of action as to upset the bargaining
relationship and create a situation that of itself might be conducive to
strife.
The next question is whether this inequality of bargaining power
is peculiar to a particular plant, at a particular time, in the atomic energy
industry or whether it occurs in other situations where the public in-
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terest is great. It is well recognized that there is an area in which the
right to strike may exist only insofar as it is not generally used. This
area has been variously defined to include government, railroads, the
steel industry, public utilities and some other activities. In some of
these activities the right to strike may be an important aspect of the
bargaining relationship even if used sparingly. However, other situa-
tions exist in which the strike is not appropriate at any time and, in
fact, the strike has been abandoned either voluntarily or as a result of
legislative action.
In firefighting, for instance, a stoppage is never appropriate because
'the community cannot risk the disaster that could result from the lack
of this protection. As long ago as 1930, the AFL firefighters union
recognized this and adopted a constitutional provision that "We shall
not strike or take active part in any sympathetic strike, since the work
of firefighters is different from that performed by any other workers,
as we are employed to perform the duties of protecting the lives and
property of communities in case of fire or serious hazards." A few
other unions, principally those whose membership is confined to govern-
ment employees, have also included no strike provisions in their consti-
tutions. Certainly the right to strike cannot be an important aspect of
the bargaining relationship where the union constitution forecloses the
possibility of its use. An equality of bargaining power that is based in
part on freedom of employees to engage in a concerted withdrawal of
services will not result. As most unions that have voluntarily relin-
quished the right to strike are composed largely of employees of gov-
ernmental bodies, a possible alternative for strike action may be pro-
vided them in the form of political action. That the firefighters union,
after 18 years' experience with a constitutional no-strike provision, does
not believe that political action is an adequate alternative for the right
to strike is evidenced by the fact that this union has recently advocated
compulsory arbitration and has urged legislation to this end.
In the railroad industry care has been taken to maintain a legal right
to strike. However, in the single instance in recent years where a
strike of some magnitude was attempted on the nation's railroads the
strikers were faced within 48 hours with a demand by the President of
the United States for legislation of a drastic character. The impact of
the public interest on railroad workers is such that they have little more
actual freedom to exercise the right to strike than do firemen or than
did the Oak Ridge atomic energy workers. The right to strike there-
fore is of quite limited value in the bargaining process because upon
sober judgment the workers, their leaders and the employers all know
that it is not appropriate for use in the circumstances.
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Certain utility workers are also limited in their use of the strike.
The impact on health and safety from complete stoppage of the water
supply in a large city might be of disaster proportions. A complete
stoppage of gas or electricity over a substantial area could present a
similar situation and approximately one fourth of the states have passed
laws prohibiting strikes by employees of public utilities.
2
All of these activities, i.e., certain atomic energy operations, fire-
fighters, certain utilities and national railroads are activities in which
the strike is not considered appropriate for use on any substantial scale
whether or not there is legislation prohibiting it. If a stoppage occurs
in such activities, the public reaction is immediate and focused adversely
on the striking employees. In such situations government will act
quickly in any manner within its power to bring about a continuance
of operations. In the absence of an adequate alternative for the right
to strike there will not be that equality of bargaining power which our
national labor policy contemplates.
There are occasions when strikes in certain other activities may also
endanger the public health or safety. Prolonged stoppages in the basic
industries such as steel may do this. However, at the outset of a strike
in a basic industry the effect on the public will likely be one of incon-
venience rather than of danger to health and safety. There will usually
be some stockpiles to cushion the full effect of the stoppage. The re-
action of public opinion may be directed toward one or both disputants.
Government will not immediately intervene to compel a resumption of
operations. Accordingly, the right to strike is still an important aspect
of the bargaining relationship even though there is not that full freedom
for its use that exists in industries only remotely related to the public
interest.
In a different category again, as regards the relationship between
work stoppages and public interest, are the large mass production in-
dustries. Strikes in mass industries do create great public inconvenience
but there is not a direct threat to health and safety. The reaction of the
public to a stoppage in mass production will be slower and the public
will be better informed as to the issues. The reaction may be directed
at either or both disputants and may contribute to the endurance power
of one disputant at the expense of the other. This is the opposite of a
public response that is so immediate that actual freedom of action of
the employees is impaired without comparable risk to the other disputant.
In view of the quite different effects of the public interest in these
See (Note, 1948) Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 47 MIcH. L.
Rav. 242. Compare Local 170, Transport Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v.
Gadola, 34 N. W. 2d 71 (Mich., 1948) and Van Riper v. Traffic Telephone Work-
ers Federation, 61 A. 2d 570 (N. J. Ch., 1948). [Ed.]
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various activities, the role of the government needs to be flexible and
vary with each type of activity. Restrictions on the normal and funda-
mental freedoms of action of either employer or employees may create
an unbalance of bargaining power which in the long run may be con-
ducive to strife. The placing of corresponding restrictions on both em-
ployer and employees might result in equality of restriction but might
not result in equality of bargaining power because there might be no area
left for bargaining. In any event, it would appear wise to move slowly
and first meet the particular problems of the areas of activity where the
public interest is greatest.
The first need is to restore an equality of bargaining power to em-
ployees in those activities where it does not now exist because of the
inappropriateness of strike action. Until an adequate method of doing
this has been determined, it would seem advisable to caution against the
possible creation of new inequalities elsewhere by the elimination of the
right to strike in areas where it still does contribute to stability. Such
an approach, of course, does not foreclose supplementing the usual gov-
ernment role of conciliation by devices for dealing with emergency
situations. There are many such devices. It is important, however, that
the usual government role be confined to conciliation and that it be un-
certain to the disputants whether the government will play any other
role in a particular dispute. Only if this condition exists will the dis-
putants put forth maximum efforts to reach a settlement of their own.
In those activities, however, wherc the strike is rarely, if ever,
appropriate, an alternative for the right to strike may need to be pro-
vided as a regular adjunct of bargaining. Within the Atomic Energy
Commission itself, and in discussions with the private employers and the
unions participating in the development of this industry, a great amount
of attention has been given this subject and many possible alternatives
have been explored. None has been found that all interested persons
were willing to accept. And we have considered that acceptance on a
voluntary basis by the bulk of the persons affected is essential to work-
ability. Another requisite has been that any device selected should be
sensitive to economic change in order that the working conditions and
wage rates of employees may be at least as favorable as those in other
industries. We have also considered it important that resort to any
alternative, like resort to the strike itself, should not be too easy and
should involve an element of risk which will compel the exercise of
sober -judgment. At the same time it has appeared that the alternative
should be available without creation of a state of emergency, the threat-
ening of a strike or like action. It has been recognized also that the
alternative may on occasion involve the necessity for a decision by a
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third party which will be accepted by the immediate disputants as a
resolution of the issues. The majority of unions in our industry by and
large have indicated willingness to accept some form of pre-established
arbitration coupled with a recognition of the relative lack of freedom
to strike. The private employers in general have been reluctant to com-
mit themselves to arbitration. They have expressed the conviction that
they could not live under the limitation on management freedom and
prerogative that might result.
It has also been suggested that there would be no strikes in the in-
dustries where the public interest is greatest if there were no unions
here. The Atomic Energy Commission, however, is convinced that the
new industry of atomic energy should be developed to the fullest extent
possible within the framework of current industrial practice; that there
is a need for labor organizations of employees working on atomic energy
and that accordingly labor organizations should be welcomed in the in-
dustry; that the national policy of assuring an equality of bargaining
power between employer and employees is particularly important in this
industry. As a step toward these ends, the Atomic Energy Commission
several months ago lifted the war-time restrictions on labor organizations
and opened all of its installations to permit union recognition by the pri-
vate employers operating its plants.
The problem has been to bring about an equality of bargaining power
without the imposition of restrictions that although equal as between
employer and employees might discourage the resourceful, aggressive,
and imaginative leadership needed on the part of both management and
labor in the development of this new industry. An approach that has
seemed to offer some hope has been establishment of industry policies
on major items of wages and working conditions. There has been sub-
stantial acceptance of the idea that a wage policy could be developed
which would define general standards to which representatives of em-
ployers and of employees could address themselves in the negotiation of
wage scales. Wide differences of opinion have appeared, however, as
to the treatment of benefit plans. In its Metal Trades Bulletin the AFL
has proposed government-established, industry-wide benefit plans deter-
mined after consideration of proposals by the unions and the employers,
with appropriate procedures for redetermination of such plans as circum-
stances warrant. The employers here already have benefit plans on a
company-wide basis covering all of the activities of the employer. They
have not considered it practicable to establish atomic energy benefit plans
which would be different from the plans in their plants outside of atomic
energy.
Both employers and unions in the atomic energy program have
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accepted the recommendations of the President's Labor Management
Conference of 1945 in respect to contract provisions relating to the
handling of grievances and in respect to disputes as to the meaning and
interpretation of agreements.
The work we have done in atomic energy in trying to solve these
various problems has not provided many answers in our own industry.
We have made progress. In the meantime, the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy has held public hearings on the matter.
In addition, the President has appointed a special commission of three
experts to study the problems and make recommendations to him. Any
principles that we may have developed as basic requisites for a solution
may or may not be applicable elsewhere. An effort has been made in
this paper, however, to outline the problems and to indicate some of the
requirements that need to be met if a workable solution is to be found
in our industry.
